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This Note considers the extent of gender discrimination in
international sports, providing an overview of gender discrimination in
sports and detailing the inadequacies of current statutory remedies.
Additionally, this Note describes why constitutional remedies are
unavailable for these athletes, highlighting a 1987 Supreme Court case
holding that sports governing bodies are not state actors. This Note
proposes overruling that case to hold instead that international sports
governing bodies are state actors and are, therefore, subject to the
provisions in the US Constitution. Under this solution, international
athletes could bring gender discrimination claims against these bodies
under an equal protection rationale.
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Megan Rapinoe is one of the most elite women's soccer players
in the world. In addition to being named to the US Women's National
Team (USWNT) roster for over ten years, she was also a key part of
the team that won the FIFA Women's World Cup title in 2015, the
most prestigious title in women's soccer.' However, just months after
this historic win for the US team, Rapinoe suffered a serious injury-a
tear of her ACL in her right knee-that sidelined her from the game
for months.2 She suffered the injury due to a subpar training field
with poorly maintained grass and dangerous conditions all along the
pitch.3 The team was scheduled to play a match two days later;
however, they decided to cancel because of player safety concerns.4 In
the stadium where the game was to be held, there were sharp rocks
lining the field and the turf was pulling up from the ground.5 In a
tough decision, the team decided to forfeit the game to avoid the risk
of losing another elite player like Rapinoe.6
Rapinoe's injury would not have happened if she were
male-male players also suffer ACL injuries, but they are not
attributable to subpar or dangerous playing conditions. While men's
teams are never forced to play on turf-an inherently rougher surface
than grass, leading to more injuries-women frequently play games on
turf fields.7 Even for the biggest tournament in women's soccer, the
World Cup, the women played every game on turf surfaces.8
Unequal playing conditions are only the start of the unequal
treatment the US women's soccer team faces compared to the men's
team. The organization does not afford the women the same travel
accommodations as the men-the men fly business class and stay at
luxury hotels, while the women fly coach and rent much cheaper
1. See Megan Rapinoe, U.S. SOCCER, https://www.ussoccer.com/players/r/megan-
rapinoe#tab-2 [https://perma.cc/886Z-3DZU] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017); see also Megan Rapinoe,
TEAM USA, https://www.teamusa.org/us-soccer/athletes/Megan-Rapinoe [https://perma.ccVGQ4-
QFWR] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
2. Megan Rapinoe Tears ACL During Training; No Time Frame for Recovery, ESPN
(Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.espn.com/espnw/news-commentary/article/14295384/midfielder-
megan-rapinoe-tears-acl-right-knee [https://perma.cc/C564-KH5C].






7. Eliana Dockterman, U.S. Women's Soccer Team Refuses to Play on Turf, TIME (Dec.
8, 2015), http://time.com/4140786/womens-soccer-team-turf/ [http://perma.cc/9PQA-P35F].
8. See U.S. Women's Team Files Wage-Discrimination Action us. U.S. Soccer, ESPN
(Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/article/15102506/women-national-team-files-
wage-discrimination-action-vs-us-soccer-federation [http://perma.cc/99XX-E2MP].
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lodgings.9 Perhaps the largest indicator of the inequity the women's
team faces is pay disparity.10 While the women only earn money
(around $1,350 per player) if they win a match, the men make $5,000
per player when they lose and upwards of $17,000 for a win." When
the women's team won the World Cup in 2015, the entire team
received $2 million; the US men's team, who finished in eleventh place
in the Men's World Cup, received $9 million.12
The US Soccer Federation (US Soccer)13 and others try to
justify the disparate treatment by claiming that the women's team
does not bring in as many viewers or as much revenue as the men's
team.14 However, the Women's World Cup final averaged 25.4 million
viewers in the United States, the most for any soccer game, male or
female, in the country.15 As for profits, in 2015, the women's team
earned US Soccer $6.6 million while the men's team earned less than
$2 million.1 6 In 2016, US Soccer projected the women's team would
draw a profit of over $5 million while the men's team was projected to
lose $1 million.1 7
In March 2016, five members of the USWNT filed a complaint
against US Soccer seeking equal pay and an investigation into
9. Chloe Schama, Women's Soccer Is Done Playing Nice, ELLE (July 6, 2016),
http://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/a37386/womens-soccer-equal-pay/
[http://perma.cc/9U34-STB7].
10. See Grant Wahl, USWNT Stars Accuse U.S. Soccer of Wage Discrimination in EEOC
Filing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.si.com/planet-futbol/2016/03/31/uswnt-
eeoc-wage-discrimination-equal-pay [http://perma.cc/76KX-SCLS].
11. See id.
12. Kerry Close, Here's How Poorly Female Soccer Players Are Paid Compared to Men,
TIME: MONEY (Mar. 31, 2016), http://time.comlmoney/4277843/us-womens-soccer-equal-pay/
[http://perma.cclE573-V62H].
13. US Soccer is "the governing body of soccer in all its forms in the United States,"
including both the women's and men's national teams. U.S. Soccer Reaching New Heights, U.S.
SOCCER, http://www.ussoccer.com/about/about-us-soccer [http://perma.cclXYV6-D4E9] (last
visited Dec. 21, 2017).
14. Andrew Das, Top Female Players Accuse U.S. Soccer of Wage Discrimination, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/sports/soccer/uswnt-us-women-carli-
1loyd-alex-morgan-hope-solo-complain.html [http://perma.cc/4GKF-XL5K].
15. Richard Deitsch, USA-Japan Women's World Cup Final Shatters American TV
Ratings Record, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 6, 2015), http://www.si.com/planet-
futbol/2015/07/06/usa-japan-womens-world-cup-tv-ratings-record [https://perma.cc/9KX9-
MKNK].
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discriminatory actions." While the complaint filed by members of the
USWNT provides a good example highlighting the issues,
discrimination against female athletes occurs across a broad range of
sports.19 Most troubling is that these women cannot turn to the US
Constitution for relief because the perpetrators of the discrimination
are organizations the Supreme Court has deemed to be private
actors.20 In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Committee, the Court held that US sports governing bodies
(in that case, the US Olympic Committee) are not "state actors" and
are, accordingly, not governed by the restrictions in the Constitution.21
Rather, these governing bodies are private actors subject only to
restrictions in federal and state statutes.22
It is hypocritical that the United States holds these athletes
out as representatives, yet the athletes cannot turn to the country's
founding document for relief when they are unfairly discriminated
against because of their gender. Dissenting in San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Justice Brennan argued that an entity that is endowed by
the state with functions governmental in nature should be classified
as a state actor.23 His argument centered around the fact that US
sports governing bodies portray themselves as representatives of our
nation and, thus, perform a traditional government function.24 If
classified as state actors, these governing bodies would be subject to
the restrictions of the Constitution.25
One of the most important protections of the Constitution that
would affect sports governing bodies is the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the corresponding equal protection
18. Juliet Spies-Gans, USWNT Files Lawsuit Against U.S. Soccer in Fight for Equal
Pay, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlentry/uswnt-wage-
discriminatory-suit-us-soccer us_56fd33c3e4bOaO6d5804ecac [http://perma.cclE57F-QL42].
19. See, e.g., Michele Morris, Olympic Gender Discrimination,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michele-morris/olympic-
gender-discrimina b 461592.html [http://perma.cc/S9D3-EKVF] (discussing discrimination in
the Olympics); Serena Williams Slams Inequality and Discrimination in Open Letter, CNN (Nov.
30, 2016, 6:37 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/30/tennis/serena-williams-tennis-letter-equal-
pay-discriminationlindex.html [http://perma.cc/UD4Z-D2EN] (discussing discrimination faced by
Serena Williams in professional women's tennis); Jill Martin Wrenn, Women's Athletics a Battle
for Respect, CNN (Feb. 7, 2013, 11:28 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/06/living/women-in-
sports/index.html [http://perma.cc/CX7M-YWJG] (highlighting discrimination in women's
basketball).
20. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543-47 (1987).
21. Id. at 542-43, 547.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 548-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 550.
25. Id. at 549, 556, 560.
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component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.26
Specifically, these governing bodies could be subject to gender
discrimination claims brought by female athletes as a violation of
their right to equal protection of the laws. Women need to have this
protection to remedy discrimination because the current venues for
relief for a gender discrimination claim in sports are inadequate.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of gender
discrimination within sports and current venues for relief, using the
USWNT's current lawsuit to exemplify these concepts. Part II
discusses why those current venues for relief are inadequate and how
new venues could arise if the Court classified international sports
governing bodies as state actors. Part III proposes overruling San
Francisco Arts & Athletics and classifying US sports governing bodies
as state actors so that athletes who are discriminated against because
of their gender may bring equal protection claims under the
Constitution.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Women's Participation in Sports and Gender
Discrimination
Athletic competitions began as traditionally all-male with
women excluded entirely.27 In the late 1800s and early 1900s-as
women's rights began to progress-women began to participate in
baseball, basketball, and gymnastics competitions but still to a much
lesser degree than their male counterparts.28 The first significant
development for women in professional sports came in 1943 with the
adoption of the All-American Girls Softball League.29 Created to fill
the void from men leaving to fight in World War II, the league
eventually transformed into the All-American Girls Professional
26. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. Whether the challenged action falls into the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment depends on whether the discrimination was perpetuated by a
state or federal actor. See id.; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). While the Fifth
Amendment does not explicitly address equal protection, the Supreme Court has held that the
federal government is subject to the same equal protection standard under the Fifth Amendment
as the states are through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499-500. For
further discussion, see infra Part II.B.
27. Richard C. Bell, A History of Women in Sport Prior to Title IX, SPORT J. (Mar. 14,
2008), http://thesportjournal.org/article/a-history-of-women-in-sport-prior-to-title-ix/
[http://perma.cc/L4M5-GEXX].
28. See Timeline: A Brief History of Women's Team Sports in America, PBS (July 17,
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Baseball League and was the sole source of baseball during a time
when most of the male players were deployed.30 The league seemed to
be a substantial step for the women's sports movement, as it put
female athletes at the forefront of a major sport; however, the league
disbanded in 1954 after the war ended and the men returned.31
While the disbandment of the baseball league represented a
setback for women's sports, the 1950s and 1960s saw the feminist
movement take off. 32 The movement motivated women to actively
seek participation in arenas that were traditionally male dominated,
including sports.33 The push for equality in sports began at the
collegiate level with women seeking equal access to participate and
athletic programs that mirrored those offered to men.3 4 In 1972, Title
IX of the Education Amendments was passed.35 Title IX prohibited
discrimination or exclusion on the basis of sex by any educational
program, including athletics, that received federal financial
assistance.36 At the collegiate level, this required any college or
university receiving such funding to provide equal athletic
opportunities to women.37 While Title IX mandated equality in
collegiate athletics, many colleges and universities questioned how to
implement the requirements, and compliance was slow. 38 However,
there was eventually progress stemming from Title IX, and in 1977,
Brown University formed the first varsity women's soccer program.39
The push for equality at the collegiate level helped open the
door for women seeking the same equality and opportunities at the
professional level.40  In 1988, the American Women's Baseball
Association formed in Chicago, boasting four teams.41 In 1991, China
hosted the first FIFA Women's World Cup, where the US team won
and sparked a new interest in the women's game.42 In 1996, there
were two major steps for women's professional sports: (1) the debut of
30. Bell, supra note 27; Timeline, supra note 28.
31. See Bell, supra note 27; Timeline, supra note 28.
32. See Bell, supra note 27.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id.; see also Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-07, 86 Stat.
235, 373-75 (1972) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2012)).
36. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
37. See Athletics, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR., https://nwlc.org/issue/athletics/
[http://perma.cc/ALG5-R8V2] (last visited Sep. 9, 2017).
38. Id.
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women's soccer at the Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia, and (2) the
formation of the Women's National Basketball Association (WNBA). 43
While these represented significant strides in the evolution of women's
professional sports, discrimination against female athletes persisted
as they were continuously viewed as inferior to their male
counterparts.44
One of the main reasons for this view of women as inferior in
sports is the historically masculine nature of athletics.45  Society
deemed masculinity and toughness-thought to be attributable only to
men-to be required qualities to participate in sports.46 Traditional
gender norms indicated that women who wanted to play sports were
intruding in a world where they did not belong.47 These restrictive
gender norms expected women to have "beauty and grace" rather than
athleticism or physical skill, and those who played sports were seen as
defying gender roles that permeated society for centuries.48
These gendered stereotypes translated into discrimination
through less media coverage, poorer playing conditions, and pay
inequalities. The media covers women's sports significantly less than
it covers men's.49 In a 2015 update to a twenty-five-year study of Los
Angeles news stations conducted in 2014, thirty-two segments
featured women's sports while 880 featured men's sports.50 That same
study found that "SportsCenter," one of the most prominent segments
for sports news, featured 376 stories on men's sports and only thirteen
stories on women's sports.51 In that study, researchers stated that
women's sports continue "to be covered in ways that convey the
message to audiences that women's sport is less important, less
exciting, and, therefore, less valued than men's sports."52
43. Id.
44. Joshua A. Senne, Examination of Gender Equity and Female Participation in Sport,







50. Cheryl Cooky, Michael A. Messner & Michela Musto, "It's Dude Time!": A Quarter
Century of Excluding Women's Sports in Televised News and Highlight Shows, 3 COMM. & SPORT
261, 263-64, 267 (2015), cited in Catherine Taibi, TVIgnores Women's Sports Now More Than It
Did 25 Years Ago, HUFFINGTON POST (June 9, 2015),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/08/womens-sports-tv-n_7535766.html
[http://perma.cclHTQ9-5CNL].
51. Id. at 267.
52. Id. at 264.
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The amount of media coverage is not the only problem-there
is also the issue of how the media portrays women in sports.53
Although the coverage is rare, what does get covered often focuses on
gendered stereotypes.54  Media coverage frequently sexualizes
women's sports with commentators focusing on athletes' appearance
more than their athletic skill or ability.55 One prominent example is
the sexualization faced by Serena Williams, one of the most elite
women's tennis players in the world.56 After she won her sixth
Wimbledon title, social media focused on her body, commenting that
she was not feminine enough.57 As she competed in the semifinals for
yet another Wimbledon title the following year, the media focused on
her outfit, claiming it was too tight and revealing.5 8 Studies show that
print references to female athletes comment on makeup, hair, or body
shape while print journalists almost never make similar comments
about male athletes.59
Additionally, poorer treatment is evidence of discrimination
against women in sports. Women are forced to play in venues inferior
to the ones where men play.60 Further, women's teams are not given
the same treatment when it comes to publicity, travel, and other
important expenditures.61 For example, female players for the US
hockey team indicated that USA Hockey, the governing body, spends
53. Senne, supra note 44.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Elizabeth Newman, No Room for Body Image Criticism in Serena Williams'
Grand Slam . Chase, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 14, 2015),
http://www.si.com/tennis/2015/07/14/serena-williams-body-image-wta-tennis
[http://perma.cc/57D6-XEW7].
57. Id. Discussions focused on the fact that Williams is not white, skinny, and blonde
like other female tennis greats such as Maria Sharapova or Caroline Wozniacki. Id.
58. Sabrina R. Perkins, Serena Williams Facing Body-Shaming with Nike Outfit at
Wimbledon, ESSENCE (July 8, 2016), http://www.essence.com/2016/07/08/serena-williams-facing-
body-shaming-nike-outfit-wimbledon [http://perma.cc/B5P9-9VAK].
59. Senne, supra note 44.
60. See, e.g., Laurent Dubois, Artificial Turf Controversy a Constant in Backdrop of
Women's World Cup, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 23, 2015), http://www.si.com/planet-
futbol/2015/06/23/womens-world-cup-artificial-turf-canada [http://perma.cc/X9YD-UVXP]. The
2015 FIFA Women's World Cup was played on turf while the Men's World Cup tournament was
played on grass. Id. Turf changes the way the game is played by changing the way the ball
bounces, the speed of play, and often leads to more injuries than grass. Julie Foudy, Sydney
Leroux: Why Turf Is Terrible for Soccer Players, ESPN (Nov. 13, 2014),
http://www.espn.com/espnw/news-commentary/article/ 11868149/sydney-leroux-explains-why-
turf-terrible-soccer-players [https://perma.cc/GX5J-9QR5].
61. See Jackie Wattles & Ahiza Garcia, Pay Fight Between USA Hockey and Women's
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$3.5 million per year developing boys' hockey programs without
spending nearly as much on girls' youth hockey.62
While media coverage and poor treatment are indicative, the
most obvious signal of gender discrimination in sports today is pay
inequality.6 3 In golf, the prize money for women's tournaments in
2014 was five times less than the prize money allocated for men's
tournaments.64 During the 2015 season, players in the WNBA had
minimum and maximum salary requirements of $38,000 and
$109,500, respectively; meanwhile, the National Basketball
Association (NBA), the all-male league, had minimum and maximum
salary requirements of $525,093 and $16.4 million, respectively, for
the same season.65 Even in sports where women's earnings come
closer to those of their male counterparts than in golf and basketball,
most of those earnings come from endorsements rather than salary.66
Members of the USWNT recently filed a lawsuit challenging
the discrimination they face through disparities in pay.6 7 Five players
filed the lawsuit on behalf of the entire team and focused on the wage
discrimination they experience in relation to their male counterparts,
the US Men's National Soccer Team.68 For winning games, members
of the USWNT earn thirty-seven cents to every dollar the men make
for the same feat.69 In 2016, the women's team would make less
money if they won every single match than the men would make if
they lost all of theirs.70 In addition to wage disparity, the women also
"earn less than the men for sponsorship appearances, have a smaller
62. Id. When asked, USA Hockey declined to specify exactly how much is spent on girls'
programs. Id.
63. See Andrew Brennan, Which Sports Have the Largest and Smallest Pay Gaps?,
FORBES (May 5, 2016, 2:09 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbrennanl2016/05/05/the-pay-
discrimination-in-sports-we-wish-didnt-exist-will-only-dissipate-with-womens-leadership/
#77fa887d41d6 [https://perma.cc/Z8ZU-BAC2] (stating that prize money for the men's 2014
Professional Golfers' Association of America (PGA) golf tournament totaled $340 million, while




66. Id. While the majority of sports have pay disparities, it is important to note that
several, including tennis, marathon running, and surfing, offer equal prize money in some
tournaments to both female and male contestants. See id.
67. Louisa Thomas, Equal Pay for Equal Play: The Case for the Women's Soccer Team,
NEW YORKER (May 27, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-case-for-
equal-pay-in-womens-sports [https://perma.cc/8A9M-QDGQ].
68. Id.
69. Justin Block, U.S. Women's Soccer Doesn't Deserve Equal Pay-They Deserve More,
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per diem while with the national team, and receive a smaller share of
ticket revenue bonuses."71 The recent lawsuit highlights the gender
discrimination issues that currently permeate all of women's sports
today.72
B. Current Venues for Relief for a Gender Discrimination Claim in
International Sports
If a professional athlete wishes to bring a gender
discrimination claim, there are currently two federal statutes that
could provide relief-the Equal Pay Act of 196373 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act (Title VII).74 First, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 states,
in relevant part, that:
No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions ... .
75
Several exceptions supplement this general prohibition.76 An
instance of permissible pay inequality under this Act includes a
payment made "pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system;
(iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than
sex."77
In order to have a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act,
the plaintiff has the burden of proving that (1) the jobs held by male
and female employees are substantially similar, and (2) the employer
is paying different wages to those engaged in this similar work.78 The
plaintiff need not prove that the skills and qualifications of a
particular employee are similar to another employee; rather, the job
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 57 (1963) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012)).
74. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012)). While Title IX does relate to discrimination
in sports and could be thought to provide a third venue for relief, it does not have regulatory
power over professional sports leagues. Tanya E. Dennis, Note, Why Is Your Grass Greener Than
Mine?: The Need for Legal Reform to Combat Gender Discrimination in Professional Sports, 50
NEw ENG. L. REV. 347, 363 (2016).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1)).
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itself must be substantially similar.79 An ideal case under the Equal
Pay Act would require a plaintiff who performs "the same job, for the
same employer, with the same responsibilities, having the same
experience" as a male counterpart.8 0 In order to rebut a claim of
discrimination under the Act, a defendant must show that these
conditions are not met or prove that the difference is justified by one of
the four listed exceptions.8 1 It is then up to the court to determine if
gender discrimination exists.82
The second statute that provides a cause of action for gender
discrimination claims is Title VII, which states, in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . . or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's ... sex[.]83
Similar to the Equal Pay Act, Title VII provides several
exceptions to pay disparity.84 Specifically, it is not unlawful under
Title VII to provide different compensation or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment if done pursuant to a seniority
system, a merit system, or a system that measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production.8 5
If a plaintiff wishes to bring a cause of action for gender
discrimination under Title VII, she cannot go directly to court as the
Act does not provide an automatic private right of action.86 Rather, a
plaintiff must first file a claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged
discrimination.8 7 After the claim is filed, the EEOC must investigate
and determine whether it believes a violation occurred.88 If the EEOC
believes a violation occurred, it may attempt conciliation or file a civil
claim against the private employer.8 9 However, if the EEOC believes
79. See id.
80. Gregory Szul, Note, Sex Discrimination and the Equal Pay Act in Athletic Coaching,
5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 161, 164 (1995).
81. Id. at 163.
82. Id. at 164.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
84. Id. § 2000e-2(h).
85. Id.
86. Jordan J. Feist, Comment, Discrimination, Retaliation, and the EEOC: The Circuit
Split over the Administrative Exhaustion Requirement in Title VII Claims, 118 PENN ST. L. REV.
169, 171 (2013).
87. Id. at 173.
88. See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)).
89. Id. at 173-74.
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no violation occurred or decides not to pursue litigation, the EEOC
must notify the aggrieved party, who has ninety days to file a civil
lawsuit on her own.90
II. ANALYSIS
Although the Equal Pay Act and Title VII theoretically could
provide relief for claims of gender discrimination in sports, their broad
exceptions allow defendants to rebut claims too easily.91  An
alternative claim for relief could come from the equal protection rights
of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution if the
law classified US sports governing bodies as state actors. A claim
using an equal protection analysis would provide the adequate relief
lacking from the two statutes currently available because it is subject
to a higher level of scrutiny and devoid of the exceptions that make
the statutes inadequate.
A. Current Venues for Relief for a Gender Discrimination Claim in
International Sports Are Inadequate
The Equal Pay Act is inadequate because the listed exceptions,
specifically those related to quantity or quality of work and skill,
provide a defense to almost every gender discrimination claim in the
athletic context.92 At first glance, female athletes may appear to have
a strong prima facie case of gender discrimination under the Equal
Pay Act.9 3 Both female and male athletes perform substantially
similar work, yet female athletes receive compensation at much lower
wages than male athletes. In the case of soccer, both the women's and
men's teams perform the same job-playing professional soccer-for
the same employer, US Soccer.94 They also have many of the same
responsibilities and experiences, performing in friendly matches
throughout the year and comparable tournaments such as the FIFA
Women's and Men's World Cups. 95 However, the women receive much
lower pay, only being compensated when they win and receiving less
for winning the World Cup than the men received for placing
90. Id. at 174.
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Dennis, supra note 74, at 369.
93. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (describing a
prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act).
94. See U.S. Soccer Reaching New Heights, supra note 13.
95. See U.S. Women's Team Files Wage-Discrimination Action vs. U.S. Soccer, supra note
8.
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eleventh.96 These factors would seem to make out a strong prima facie
case for gender discrimination under the Equal Pay Act; however, the
exceptions included make it easy for a defendant, such as US Soccer,
to rebut this claim.97
The first exceptions under the Equal Pay Act that could rebut a
claim of gender discrimination are the exceptions for seniority, merit,
quantity of production, and factors other than sex.9 8 Included within
these groups of exceptions are "market conditions, previous salary,
exceptional experience, education," and, most important in athletics,
skill.99 With regard to previous salary, male athletes consistently
earn more than female athletes.100 However, this is likely due in part
to the fact that male athletes have had the opportunity to participate
in professional sports for a much longer period of time than female
athletes.101  This longer participation leads to higher salary
expectations and greater levels of experience that contribute to
rebuttals of gender discrimination claims.102  Additionally, the
exception for "factors other than sex," including skill, provides a
strong rebuttal because it can be argued that male and female sports
require a different skill level based on physical and biological
differences.103 Therefore, these exceptions provide the opportunity for
an employer to rebut a female athlete's prima facie case of gender
discrimination under the Equal Pay Act.104
In addition, the exception based on quality of work provides a
strong rebuttal for a claim of gender discrimination.0 5 This exception
is similar to that of a skill exception under the "factors other than sex"
category: it compares employees based on skills, effort, responsibility,
and working conditions.06 Although it is unclear how to measure
skills and effort, they are often measured against a scale that uses
male athletes' skills as the baseline.07 In comparing the two, it is
often the case that female athletics appear to require less skill and
effort than male athletics because of biological differences, including
96. Close, supra note 12.
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
98. Id.
99. Dennis, supra note 74, at 369-70.
100. Brennan, supra note 63.
101. Dennis, supra note 74, at 370.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 370-71.
104. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012).
105. See Dennis, supra note 74, at 370-71.
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
107. Dennis, supra note 74, at 370-71.
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differences in body shape and strength capabilities.108 Additionally,
defendants could argue that male athletes face harsher competition
because their opponents possess more skill, therefore requiring
greater preparation than female athletes.109 Based on these gendered,
stereotyped conceptions, an employer can also use the quality of work
exception to rebut a claim of gender discrimination under the Equal
Pay Act.110
If an employer, such as US Soccer, is able to fit its conduct into
one of these listed exceptions, the athlete's claim of gender
discrimination will fail regardless of the strength of her prima facie
case.111 Therefore, the Equal Pay Act is an inadequate venue for relief
for a claim of gender discrimination in sports.
Similarly, Title VII is inadequate because it prevents access to
the court system and contains many of the same exceptions as the
Equal Pay Act that make it relatively easy for a defendant to rebut a
claim of gender discrimination.1 12 Title VII prevents access to the
courts because it does not confer a private right of action; rather, an
aggrieved party must first file a claim with the EEOC, which has the
initial authority to determine whether to file a case.113 While it is true
that a party may still bring a suit should the EEOC decide not to,
there is the potential for a long time to pass before the agency makes a
decision, during which the gender discrimination continues.1 1 4 For
example, members of the USWNT filed their complaint with the
EEOC in March 2016, but nearly two years later, the EEOC has yet to
make a decision or take action relating to the complaint.115
Preventing athletes' access to the court system restricts access to
injunctive relief and monetary damages that should be available.
In addition to preventing access to the courts, Title VII
contains similar exceptions to those contained within the Equal Pay
Act, which likewise makes it inadequate as an avenue for relief for
gender discrimination in sports.116  Specifically, the quantity or
quality of production exception in Title VII is identical to the exception
108. Id. at 370-71 & n.201.
109. See id. at 370-71.
110. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
111. See id.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); Dennis, supra note 74, at 359.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
114. See Meg Linehan, A Timeline of the USWNT's Legal Fights, EXCELLE SPORTS (June
6, 2016), http://www.excellesports.com/news/timeline-uswnt-fight-equality-cba-eeoc/
[http://perma.cclU7S6-8F6S].
115. Id. As of the publication of this Note, there are no updates to the status of this claim.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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in the Equal Pay Act.1 17 An employer may rebut a claim of gender
discrimination under Title VII by claiming that male athletes require
a higher quality of production than female athletes, regardless of
whether this premise is based on biological and sociological differences
that female athletes cannot prevent or change.1 18 Therefore, Title VII
,fails to provide adequate relief for a claim of gender discrimination in
sports.
B. If Classified as State Actors, Sports Governing Bodies Would Be
Subject to the Constitution.
In order to be subject to the equal protection provisions in the
Constitution, sports governing bodies would have to be classified as
state actors.119 The Supreme Court finds state action when a private
party performs a public function or when there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the private party and the government.120
The first prong of the inquiry in which the Court analyzes state
action is whether a private party performs a public or governmental
function.121 In Smith v. Allwright, the Court found state action and a
constitutional violation when the Democratic Party of Texas-a
private entity-excluded African Americans from participating in a
primary election, a public function.122 However, the fact that an entity
performs a function that serves the public does not automatically
classify that entity as a state actor; such a definition would be so
broad as to cover any business providing essential goods and
services.123 Rather, "when private individuals or groups are endowed
by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they
become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its
constitutional limitations."1 2 4
The second prong of the state action inquiry focuses on whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the private action and the
117. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
119. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("It is state action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of
the amendment.").
120. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 548-49 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). When either prong (public function or close nexus) is satisfied, the
state action requirement is met. See id. at 548 ("For two independent reasons, the action
challenged here constitutes Government action." (emphasis added)).
121. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944).
122. Id. at 662-65.
123. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 549 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1996) (emphasis added), quoted in S.F. Arts &
Athletics, 483 U.S. at 549.
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government.125 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, a private
company leased space in a public parking facility for its restaurant
and then refused to serve African American patrons.126 The Court
found that, even though a purely private entity perpetrated the
discrimination, there was a sufficiently close nexus to the government
through the lease of the public parking facility. 127 This close nexus
allows the private party's actions to "be fairly treated as that of the
State itself."1 28
In order to be classified as state actors, it must be shown that
sports governing bodies, while private actors, perform public functions
or have a sufficiently close nexus to the government so their conduct
can be treated as that of the government itself.129
Once a sports governing body is classified as a state actor, an
opposing party may bring a gender discrimination claim under the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment
explicitly discusses equal protection, stating that "[n]o state shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."13 0 However, as the text indicates, this Amendment is
only applicable to the states and not to the federal government. The
Fifth Amendment, on the other hand, applies to the federal
government. It demands that "[n]o person shall . .. be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."131 While it speaks of
due process, the Fifth Amendment does not include any language
addressing the equal protection of the laws.
Despite this lack of explicit language, the Supreme Court
interpreted the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause as including a
component of equal protection, making it practically identical to the
provision applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.132 While recognizing that the two terms are not always
interchangeable, the Court determined that both due process and
equal protection stem from an "American ideal of fairness" and are,
therefore, "not mutually exclusive."133 The Court further clarified that
"discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
125. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
126. Id. at 716-18.
127. Id. at 723-26.
128. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 556 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 548-48.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
132. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
133. Id.
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process," thereby linking the concept of equal protection to the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.134 Therefore, regardless of whether
a state or federal actor practices discriminatory behavior, it must
comply with the restrictions in the Constitution under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.135
A claim of gender discrimination is subject to intermediate
scrutiny.136 The Supreme Court has articulated three tiers of scrutiny
for constitutional claims: strict scrutiny,137 intermediate scrutiny,138
and rational basis review.139 Strict scrutiny is the most stringent
standard of review, requiring the government to have a compelling
interest behind the challenged conduct.140 Additionally, to survive
strict scrutiny, the government must prove that it employed narrowly
tailored means to reach that compelling interest.141 The Court applies
strict scrutiny as the standard of review for discrimination based on
racial classifications.1 4 2
At the other end of the spectrum, rational basis review is the
least stringent standard of review.143 Rational basis requires the
government have a legitimate interest accomplished through means
rationally related to that interest.144 Rational basis review is the
default standard when heightened scrutiny is not required due to a
suspect classification. 145
The Court determined that discrimination based on gender is
one situation in which a heightened level of scrutiny is necessary;
however, the Court declined to apply such a high standard as strict
scrutiny to gender classifications. Rather, for classifications based on
gender, the Court created a third standard that falls in between strict
scrutiny and rational basis review: intermediate scrutiny.146
134. Id.
135. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
136. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also id. at 218 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
137. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
138. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971); see also United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,
279 (1979).
139. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
140. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
143. See, e.g., Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 314-16.
144. See id. at 314 n.6.
145. See id. at 313.
146. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75, 76-77 (1971); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Intermediate scrutiny requires the government to prove there is an
important interest accomplished by means that are substantially
related to that interest.1 47
In determining what constitutes an important state interest in
gender discrimination claims, the Court rejected objectives that rely
on overly broad generalizations about differences in talent or the roles
of men and women.148 In Orr v. Orr, the Court struck down a law that
imposed alimony obligations on husbands but not on wives because it
relied on and reinforced the outdated notion that the wife is always
the dependent.149 Additionally, the important interest may not be
based on unfounded assumptions about gender.150 In United States v.
Virginia, the Court did not accept the argument that women should be
excluded from an all-male military academy because their admittance
would destroy the academy's self-described adversative method when
there was no proof of this assertion.15 1
In determining whether the means substantially relate to the
important interest, the Court held that the government must not
resort to gender discrimination if gender-neutral means are available
as an alternative.152 In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court held that, for a
gender classification to survive intermediate scrutiny, it must be
shown that "gender alone is an accurate predictor" of the issue in
question.15 3 Further, even if a gender classification passes this part of
the test, the separate treatment must be equal.154 In United States v.
Virginia, the Court found that, even though there was a separate
military school for women to attend, the two schools were different in
kind as well as unequal in both tangible and intangible facilities.1
55
147. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); see also Reed, 404 U.S. at
75-76.
148. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
149. Id. at 282-83.
150. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541, 550 (1996) ("State actors controlling
gates to opportunity, we have instructed, may not exclude qualified individuals based on 'fixed
notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.' . . . [G]eneralizations about 'the
way women are,' estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying
opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description."
(emphasis in original) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725)).
151. See id. at 542-43.
152. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138-40, 146 (1994).
153. Id. at 138-40.
154. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547.
155. Id. at 547-48.
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C. Sports Governing Bodies Are Currently Not Classified as State
Actors
The Supreme Court heard a case in 1987 that addressed
whether or not sports governing bodies qualified as state actors.156 In
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
(SFAA), a nonprofit California corporation, attempted to promote a
proposed "Gay Olympic Games" in order to make a "political
statement about the status of homosexuals in society."157 The United
States Olympic Committee (USOC) objected to the use of the term
"Olympic," for the Amateur Sports Act granted the USOC "the right to
prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of the word."15 8
Despite the USOC requesting the SFAA remove the word "Olympic"
from all material, the SFAA persisted in its use and the USOC
brought suit to enjoin further use.159
As part of its defense, the SFAA claimed that even if the USOC
has the exclusive right to the word "Olympic," the organization
exercised the enforcement of that right in a discriminatory manner in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.160 Regarding this claim, the Court
stated that "the fundamental inquiry is whether the USOC is a
governmental actor to whom the prohibitions of the Constitution
apply."161 A majority of the Court held that the USOC did not qualify
as a governmental actor because it did not meet either of the tests for
finding state action.162
First, the majority found that a congressional grant for a
corporate charter does not alone cause a corporation to lose its
essentially private character.163 The USOC was a private organization
established under a federal statute.164 Under the statute, Congress
granted the USOC a corporate charter while imposing certain
requirements and providing for funding through exclusive use of
156. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 (1987). The
following year, the Supreme Court decided that actions by a collegiate athletic association (the
National Collegiate Athletic Association, or NCAA) also did not constitute state action; however,
this Note is only focused on international sports governing bodies. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182 (1988).
157. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 525, 535.
158. Id. at 526-27.
159. Id. at 527.
160. Id. at 542.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 547.
163. Id. at 543-44.
164. Id. at 542-43.
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Olympic words and symbols along with direct grants.165 However, the
majority noted that all corporations act under some form of a
government charter, meaning that fact alone cannot confer state
action.166 Further, the majority found that because the government
creates all trademark rights and subsidizes many private entities,
those additional facts failed to convert the private action into that of
the government.6 7
Second, the majority found that there could be governmental
action when the "challenged entity performs functions that have been
'traditionally the exclusive prerogative' of the Federal Government."1 6 8
While recognizing that the USOC's activities served a national
interest, the majority nonetheless held that a private corporation must
do more than serve the public to constitute state action, without
specifying how much more would constitute state action.169
Finally, the majority found that "a government 'normally can
be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised
coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
[government]."' 17 0 The majority found that the USOC's choice of how
to enforce the exclusive right to the word "Olympic" was not a
governmental decision and there was no evidence of governihental
coercion in how to apply this right.171 In conclusion, the Court held
that, because there was not enough to make the USOC's action that of
the government, the SFAA's claim that the USOC enforced the right
in a discriminatory manner did not rise to a Fifth Amendment
violation.172
Disagreeing with the majority's characterization of state
action, Justice Brennan wrote in dissent, joined in full by Justice
Marshall-with Justices Blackmun and O'Connor agreeing on the
state action issue.173 The dissenters found two distinct reasons why
165. Id. at 543.
166. Id. at 543-44.
167. Id. at 544.
168. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)).
169. See id. at 544-45.
170. Id. at 546 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
171. Id. at 547.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 548 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In a separate
opinion, Justices O'Connor and Blackmun dissented in part from the majority's opinion, stating
that
the United States Olympic Committee and the United States are joint participants in
the challenged activity and as such are subject to the equal protection provisions of
the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals' finding of no
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the action at issue should have been classified as state action.17 4 First,
the USOC should have been considered a governmental actor because
it performed important governmental functions.175 Second, the USOC
should have been considered a governmental actor because there was
"'a sufficiently close nexus between the government and the
challenged action' of the USOC that 'the action of the latter may fairly
be treated as that of the [Government] itself."'
176
The dissent's first distinction-performing important
governmental functions-expands on the majority's notion of serving
the public.177 While Justice Brennan did not disagree that something
more than serving the public is necessary to classify an action as
governmental, he defined the threshold, whereas the majority was
silent on the issue.178 Relying on precedent, Justice Brennan stated
that "when private individuals or groups are endowed by the
State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become
agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its
constitutional limitations."17 9  Further, precedent showed that "a
finding of governmental action is particularly appropriate when the
function performed is 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative' of
government."180
The dissenters felt the USOC's conduct met the standard for
government action based on these precedents because Congress
endowed the USOC with a function traditionally given to the
government-it represented the United States to the international
community.18 1 Congress placed the responsibility exclusively on the
USOC of representing the United States to the International Olympic
Committee and to the world at the Olympic Games, an international
event.182 Therefore, unlike entities which simply provide public
Government action and remand the case for determination of petitioners' claim of
discriminatory enforcement.
Id. at 548 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 548-49 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
177. See id. at 548.
178. See id. at 549.
179. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)). For
other examples of private entities carrying out state action, see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461, 470 (1953) (holding that a private political association and its elections constitute state
action); and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509-10 (1946) (holding that a privately owned
"company town" is a state actor).
180. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 549 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Jackson, 419
U.S. at 353).
181. Id. at 550.
182. Id.
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services but remain inherently private in nature, the USOC had "the
exclusive power to serve a unique national, administrative,
adjudicative, and representational role."183 Because the government
bestowed upon the USOC functions that are traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the government, the dissent believed that its
actions, like those of the government, "ought to be subject to
constitutional limits."1 8 4
The dissent's second distinction was that the Government had
"so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the
USOC] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity." 185 The relationship between the government and
the USOC conferred mutual benefits, and the authorizing statute gave
the USOC exclusive authority and responsibilities not given to any
other private organization.186 Additionally, in the eyes of the public,
the connection between the US government and the USOC was
profound.187 For example, the US flag flies to identify the US Olympic
Team, and the Olympic athletes compete as representatives of the
United States, not the USOC.188
Therefore, because the USOC performs a government function
and because the challenged action is inextricably intertwined with the
government, Justice Brennan would have found state action in San
Francisco Arts & Athletics.189 However, because the majority opinion
is the controlling law, international sports governing bodies are not
considered state actors and international athletes do not have the
protections of the Constitution.
III. SOLUTION
If female athletes performing in international competition wish
to bring a claim of gender discrimination, as the USWNT athletes
recently did, they may only rely on statutory provisions for relief.
However, these statutes provide inadequate relief due to the
numerous exceptions which allow a defendant great leeway to rebut a
gender discrimination claim. These athletes represent the United
States in international competition; therefore, they should be subject
to and protected by the provisions of the Constitution. In order to
183. Id. at 555-56.
184. Id. at 556.
185. Id. (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
186. Id. at 557.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 557-58.
189. Id. at 560.
940 [Vol. 20:3:919
EQUAL PROTECTION FOR EQUAL PLAY
extend the Constitution's protections, the Court should overrule San
Francisco Arts & Athletics and hold that US-sponsored sports
governing bodies are state actors. Once the Court classifies these
bodies as state actors, female athletes could bring meritorious claims
of gender discrimination under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
These claims would be subject to intermediate scrutiny, and in the
case of a claim such as the USWNT's current lawsuit, the
discrimination would likely be found unconstitutional.
In order for US sports governing bodies to be considered state
actors, the Supreme Court would have to overrule its prior decision in
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, which reached the opposite
conclusion.190 Although stare decisis is a strong justification for the
Court to uphold its prior decisions, the Court has also held that it is
not an inexorable command.191 In determining when to overrule its
prior precedent, the Court developed a test in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey with four inquiries that would
justify abandoning stare decisis.192 The first is whether the rule is
practically workable.193  The second is whether the rule has
engendered such reliance that it would lead to hardships if
overruled.194 The third is whether related principles of law have
developed over time, making the rule "a remnant of abandoned
doctrine."195 Finally, the fourth is whether facts changed or have come
to be seen so differently that the rule has lost "significant application
or justification."196
In determining whether to overrule San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, the first and third inquiries of this test are largely
unhelpful.197 The first inquiry is inapplicable because there is no
evidence that the current rule, finding sports governing bodies are not
state actors, has been unworkable in practice. While there are
disagreements over the correctness of this rule, it is clearly workable
as it simply makes the equal protection provisions of the Constitution
190. See id. at 547 (majority opinion).
191. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
192. Id. at 854-55. While these four inquiries are helpful to the Court in deciding when to
abandon stare decisis, they are not dispositive. See id. at 854 ("[W]hen this Court reexamines a
prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the
rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for
example, we may ask. . . ." (emphasis added)).
193. Id. at 854.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 855.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 854-55.
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inapplicable in these cases, forcing athletes to turn to statutory
provisions for requested relief.198 Additionally, the third inquiry is
inapplicable because there have been no developments in
constitutional law that would make the current rule abandoned
doctrine.199 Therefore, if the Court is to overrule San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, it will have to rely on the second and fourth inquiries in the
Casey test by determining that they outweigh the first and third
inquiries.
The second factor in the Casey test, focusing on reliance,
supports the argument that the state action component of San
Francisco Arts & Athletics should be overruled. While other portions
of the case are significantly relied upon, subsequent case law rarely
cites the case's proposition that sports governing bodies are not state
actors.200 When cited, the cases often deal with sports governing
bodies that do not participate in international competitions,
distinguishing them from the subject of this Note.201 Therefore, the
second inquiry weighs in favor of overruling the state action holding
as applied to US sports governing bodies participating in international
competition.
The fourth inquiry of the Casey test is the strongest argument
for overruling the state action portion of San Francisco Arts &
Athletics. The fourth inquiry asks whether facts changed significantly
or are seen so differently that the rule has lost application or
justification.202 The Court decided San Francisco Arts & Athletics in
1987, over thirty years ago.2 0 3  The case focused on state action
regarding the USOC based on a trademark claim without addressing
the implications of the ruling for sports in general, including gender
discrimination claims.204 Women's sports changed significantly since
1987-importantly, most of the major developments in women's sports
did not occur until after this date.205 Not only have sports changed
198. See supra Part I.B.
199. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
200. See SHEPARD'S@: SAN FRANCISCO ARTS & ATHLETICS, INC. V. UNITED STATES
OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, 483 U.S. 522: CITING DECISIONS, LEXIS,
https://advance.lexis.comlapipermalink/9b767953-5320-4718-853e-
03120b90ccdc/?context=1000516 (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
201. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 180-82 (1988)
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significantly in the past thirty years, but also women's rights and
gender discrimination doctrine have evolved significantly since this
ruling.206 With these changing facts and differing landscapes in sports
and women's rights, the fourth inquiry under Casey is satisfied and
supports overruling San Francisco Arts & Athletics.
In addition to the two factors from Casey supporting a
departure from stare decisis, it is also relevant that San Francisco
Arts & Athletics had four dissenters on the issue of state action.20 7
The dissenters presented a strong argument for state action in the
case of US-sponsored sports governing bodies-when an organization
is tasked with representing the United States on an international
stage, a function that is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
government, it becomes a state actor subject to the provisions of the
Constitution.20 8 Indeed, it seems hypocritical to tell athletes that they
represent the United States on an international, professional
platform, yet they cannot rely on the protections of their country's
founding document. The strength of this argument and the support
from four out of nine members of the Court provide the current Court
with strong arguments for overruling the prior decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
Discrimination against women is not unique to sports; rather,
it is a concept that has been challenged and fought against for years
as women attempt to be seen as equal to men.209 However, the sports
context heightens this problem because it is a field that is
traditionally male and dominated by masculine concepts.2 10 It is hard
to imagine a male athlete participating in international competition
ever suffering an injury like Megan Rapinoe's-an injury caused by
subpar training conditions.211 That male athlete would never be
subjected to the conditions that caused the injury, simply by virtue of
206. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138-40, 146 (1994) (holding that the
government may not discriminate based on gender if gender-neutral alternatives are available);
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1996) (finding unconstitutional gender
discrimination when female students were not allowed to attend an all-male military academy).
207. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 548 (O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 548-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 549-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. See Timeline of Legal History of Women in the United States, NAT'L WOMEN'S HIST.
PROJECT, http://www.nwhp.org/resources/womens-rights-movement/detailed-timeline/
[http://perma.cclP8ME-Y9M8] (last visited Jan. 5, 2018).
210. See Senne, supra note 44.
211. See USWNT, supra note 3.
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being male. This unacceptable gender discrimination in the sports
context, which reaches millions of Americans, needs to be remedied.
The current avenues for relief for a claim of gender
discrimination in sports consist of bringing a claim under either the
Equal Pay Act 2 12 or Title VII.213 However, these venues are
inadequate because they both contain exceptions, most notably for
skill, that allow an employer relying on traditional gender norms to
fairly easily rebut a claim of discrimination in sports.214 In order for
female athletes to adequately seek a remedy for the gender
discrimination they face, they need to be able to turn to the
protections of the Constitution: the legal cornerstone of the country
they represent.
In order for female athletes to utilize the protections of the
Constitution, sports governing bodies participating in international
competition need to be classified as state actors. However, in San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, the Supreme Court held the opposite-that
a sports governing body was not a state actor and therefore was not
subject to the provisions of the Constitution.2 1 5 Thus, in order to
obtain this much-needed relief, the Supreme Court needs to overrule
that case. The reasons in favor of overturning the decision follow
logically from Justice Brennan's arguments in dissent.216 While stare
decisis generally counsels against overruling Supreme Court
precedent, the second and fourth inquirieS217 from the Casey test
outweigh all other considerations.
Once the Court decides to overrule San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, female athletes could argue gender discrimination violates
their rights under equal protection. In order to rebut such a claim, an
employer must show the discrimination is pursuant to an important
interest and that the means chosen to discriminate (such as lower pay
and poorer treatment) are substantially related to the achievement of
that interest.218
When female athletes bring in greater revenue for an
organization than their male counterparts, there is simply no viable
important interest served by discriminating against them through
unequal pay or poorer playing conditions. Even when female athletes
212. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
214. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
215. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987).
216. Id. at 548-49, 550, 556, 560 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
218. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); see also Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
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bring in the same or less revenue than their male counterparts, there
is still no important interest to be served by subjecting them to poorer
conditions than the men. Therefore, with the equal protection
guarantee of the Constitution behind the claims of female athletes
subjected to discriminatory behavior, gender discrimination in sports
could begin to be remedied.
Female athletes who represent the United States in
international competition should be able to rely on the US
Constitution for relief when they are unfairly discriminated against
based on their gender. Governing bodies, like US Soccer, should not
be able to hide behind overly broad statutory provisions in order to
enable them to pay women less and subject them to poorer conditions.
Women have been making immense strides in the world of sports, and
it is time for a new achievement: eradicating gender discrimination.
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